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ABSTRACT 
This article proposes a model representing the relationship 
between economic actors and revenue seeking governments. Given a need 
for revenues, the model predicts the allocation of the new tax burden 
and patterns of control over public policy. 
The model is motivated by the history of the rise of 
parliaments in Western Europe. It is extended to urban and 
developmental politics. It is designed to employ the techniques of 
"neo-classical" economics to explore themes which have been developed 
most clearly in Marxist writings. 
Most importantly, the model suggests the way in which, given a 
need for revenues, specific fractions of the private sector can gain 
control over public policy. And it characterizes precisely the 
factors which yield differences in the ability of economic agents to 
employ the market to defect from the tax- levying state. The analysis 
thus gives insight into both the origins and the limitations of 
political democracy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Revenue seeking governments may well find it to their 
advantage to strike bargains with citizens whose assets they seek to 
tax. To induce a greater willingness to pay taxes, they may defer to 
the citizens' policy preferences. Such bargains may become more 
beneficial from the citizens' point of view the more mobile the assets 
the citizens hold. 
These claims form the central themes of this paper. Their 
significance lies primarily in the light they cast upon the origins 
and limitations of democratic institutions. For they suggest the 
dynamics whereby asset owning elites can wrest control over public 
policy from revenue seeking monarchs, thereby securing the triumph of 
democracy. They also suggest the manner in which asset owning elites 
can secure political power by threatening market defection, thereby 
imposing their political will through the private market and 
compromising the power of public institutions. 1 In this paper, we 
explore such themes while drawing upon a variety of materials: the 
evidence of history, formal reasoning, and the musings of other 
scholars. 
In investigating these ideas, this paper resonates with the 
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work of other scholars. Margaret Levi and Douglass North represent 
the state as a predatory revenue maximizer and explore the 
implications of bargaining between rulers and private agents for the 
evolution of institutions. Both Levi and North practice the "new 
institutional history" -- a field of scholarship which applies the 
tools of neoclassical economics to the study of institutional change. 2 
Their principal interlocutors -- the devotees of Marx -- employ the 
tools of class analysis. In so doing, they associate absolutist power 
with agrarianism; the rise of parliaments with the rise of commerce; 
and the domination of the policy process in the modern era by capital, 
the most mobile factor of production. 3 
This paper possesses as one of its objectives the elision of 
th ese two fields of scholarship. 
The paper also seeks to contribute to the literature on 
political development.4 Lipset, Coleman and others have related the 
level of economic development of various nations to the level of 
democracy exhibited by their political institutions. An objective of 
th is paper is to provide a causal, or theoretical, grounding for the 
correlations which they observed. A second objective is to point out 
a normative error in their arguments. We will show that it is indeed 
likely that subnational fractions can come to dominate national policy 
making, and that the creation of democratic institutions therefore 
sh ould not be uncritically equated with the enhancement of the 
collective welfare. 
A TURN TO HISTORY 
The Demand for Taxes 
Historians of Western Europe stress that the fiscal problems 
of monarchs were driven by a common political imperative: the search 
for revenues with which to prosecute wars. 
In his study of thirteenth-century England, for example, 
Michael Prestwich underscores "the importance and interest of the 
King' s wars. ,, S Noting that "the traditional revenues of the crown 
. . .  were quite inadequate for his needs [and that] the fines and 
scutages 
• . did not come near to raising the funds needed to pay 
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troops, " Prestwich interprets the reign of Edward I in terms of his 
search for new taxes. 6 And in studying royal taxation in Fourteenth­
century France, John Bell Henneman states "the king had to pay his 
troops. Sane military forces had to be maintained during truces or in 
times of peace. . . • Continually short of money, the king had to 
consider two possible remedies: one was the use of fiscal expedients 
which might provide a temporary windfall; the other was to find a 
different basis for taxation . •  .,7 As Henneman bluntly concludes: 
"tc.xes were virtually synonymous with war financing. ,, S 
The situation in England and France found its parallel 
th roughout historical Europe: under the stimulus of warfare, monarchs 
sought greater public revenues. But, as Zolberg notes, when "the 
central power [looked] within the country for more efficient means of 
mobilizing the resources he needed, the effects produced were by no 
means exclusively determined by the external stimulus . .,9 Warfare did 
not determine the nature of the tax system chosen nor the political 
consequences of that choice, Zolberg contends. Rather 
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It seems • • .  that • . •  a set of economic and social conditions 
dictated to the English state a strategy for mobilizing resources 
based primarily on trade whereas France, while developing the salt 
tax, lived mainly on direct taxes, and that this difference 
contributed tv the differentiation of their representative 
institutio ns. 10 
The English monarchy sought to tax trade and this, Zolberg 
argues, promoted the growth of parliamentary democracy. The French 
taxed fiscal assets, such as salt mines and land; and this Contributed 
to the growth of absolutism. 11 The historical evidence offers 
materials which allow us to fill in some of the steps which generated 
this overall pattern. 
The Nature of the Tax Base 
One of the most striking features of the evidence is that in 
both England and F1,ance it was the taxation of "moveable" property 
which promoted the conferral of political representation by revenue­
seeking monarchs. In England. traditional sources of revenue included 
collectio ns fro m the royal lands. taxes on the clergy. the proceeds of 
justice, and feudal aids. Such traditional taxes proved insufficient 
to meet the costs of warfare. As a consequence Edward I introduced 
taxes on trade and on mo veables. Moveables were assets which could be 
hidden; they were "cows. oxen, grain, houshold goods, and other 
possessions - - property that could be transferred from place to 
place. "12 
The new taxes - - the taxes on trade and moveables -- proved 
highly lucrative. Thus Mitchell notes that "Properly administered, 
they yielded far more than any other levy that we have heard about 
before, approaching the fabulous sums raised under the Anglo­
Saxons. ,.l3 They possessed two significant shortcomings, however. 
They could be easily avoided. And partially as a consequence, they 
had to be bargained for. 
s 
In discussing the politics surrounding the introduction of the 
tax on the wool trade, Strayer notes both limitations: 
the experiment should have demonstrated two things to Edward's 
advisers. In the first place . . . an increase of approximately 
lOO'li in the [tax] rate did not yield an increase of 100.. in the 
returns. In the second place, it was clear that any attempt to 
secure increases . . • by nonparliamentary means would cause 
serious protests . . . .  14 
rhe Implications for Policy Making 
A similar pattern emerged in France. Thus Henneman also notes 
that the monarch's attempts to raise greater levels of taxes led to 
the creation of forms of political representation. As he states: 
A major purpose of [my] study is to relate the legal theories to 
actual practice, and in so doing we must lo ok for guidance to the 
institutional historians. Their most valuable contributions have 
concerned representative institutions and the mechanisms of 
consent . . . •  According to the maxim guod omnes tangit, those 
whose rights were affected had to consent. On a more 
practical level, no tax could be collected without considerable 
cooperation from those who were taxed, so their acquiescence was 
needed • . .  If we are to understand the constitutional 
implications of taxation in this period, we must relate taxation 
to the use of assemblies and relate both to the question of 
consent. 15 
In common with many other historians of this period in French 
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history the mid-fourteenth century -- Henneman analyzes the variety 
of political doctrines used to jusify the levying of, or resistance 
to, taxation. But in the course of Henneman's historical narrative, 
it becomes increasingly clear that the "practical" considerations were 
more significant than the doctrinal. Communities living in or near 
war zones proved more willing to pay for defense than those who lived 
distant from them. Taxes on fixed assets, such as the gabelle, were 
set and levied without consent. 16 The more commercialized areas of 
F'rance paid a sales tax; the less commercialized paid a hearth tax. 17 
Taxes on towns were negotiated. And so too were taxes upon the 
wealthier, more commercialized sectors of the country. 18 The level of 
representation accorded different areas and interests, then, appears 
to have depended less upon the legal merits of various doctrines and 
mere upon the political and economic factors which determined the 
� f ··el of demand for the monarch• s protection and the capacity to evade 
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the monarch's levies. 
Several other features of the development of tax systems are 
notable. One is the evolution of corporate forms, a theme stressed in 
the writings of those who, like Henneman, Strayer and Postwich, are 
preoccupied with the rise of political representation. By corporate 
forms, these scholars appear to mean institutions in which a subset of 
similarly situated agents in the political economy could make 
agr<>ements binding on all such agents. 
One reason for the evolution of such agencies, they stress, is 
that the bargaining for taxes was costly to monarchs. Monarchs 
therefore appear to have desired to bargain with fewer agents -- ones 
representative of the set of all agents. 19 In addition to lower 
costs, the benefits of a collectively binding agreement were greater 
than the benefits of a tax which was imposed on the agents singly. 
Given the mobility of assets, were any one asset holder to pay a tax 
while others did not, the tax yield would decline; for the moveable 
assets would shift into the hands of those who remained untaxed. For 
these (and other) r easons, monarchs preferred collective, rather than 
individual, levies. 
The historical sources repeatedly reveal that taxpayers 
themselves also preferred to negotiate collectively. Those acceding 
to a tax preferred that all similarly situated agents be taxed at the 
same rate. In France, for example, "local jealousies led towns to 
make subsidy grants conditional upon similar grants from other towns, " 
according to Henneman20 -- behavior which no doubt reflected the 
desire and ability of business to locate in the municipality paying 
lower taxes. 
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It should be noted that the dynamics outlined thus far help to 
explain the manner in which the incentives to "free-ride" were 
overborn. Once initiated, tax-setting institutions quickly became 
"universal"; they set rates for all similarly situated agents. It was 
therefore difficult for sub-sets of the agents to receive the benefits 
of public policy while evading the costs of taxes. 
Considerations arising on both the side of the monarch, who 
sought taxes, and the asset bearers, who paid them, thus favored the 
evolution of collectively binding agreements, and such considerations 
were related to the mobility of taxables. 21 As Mitchell concludes: 
The old individualism of the aid vanished and in its place 
appeared corporate action. The fruitfulness of the levies on 
moveables and hence the desire to draw all property under 
contribution and the inability or impracticability of consulting 
all property holders led to the employment of representatives that 
might act in behal f of the taxpayers. 22 
A FORMALIZATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
This brief review of some of the historical treatments of 
earlv taxation in Europe suggests that monarchs were driven to seek 
new taxes in order to finance wars; that in their search for increased 
taxes they expanded their tax base to include trade and moveable 
property; and that a variety of considerations, including the 
elasticity of the tax yield, made it necessary for them to bargain 
with those who possessed property rights over the moveable tax base 
and to share with them formal control over the conduct of public 
affairs. 
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One way of testing this argument is by constructing a formal 
model of it and seeing whether its conclusions follow from its 
premises. We assume the existence of a monarch (actor '1') and a 
collection of taxpayers. Assuming, for purposes of simplicity, that 
the �axpayers are similar in critical respects, we will label them 
actor '2'. The monarch derives revenues and prefers some policies 
over others. The monarch's most preferred policy we label v+. The 
more revenues he possesses and the closer his government's policy 
position (V) to his ideal point, the greater his satisfaction. We 
assume the monarch to be rational; he therefore chooses that tax rate, 
t, and that policy position, V, which maximizes his utility Cu1). 
The monarch is not an autonomous agent, however; he depends 
for his taxes upon the citizens. It is citizens who control the tax 
base. The citizens desire money, which they derive from the after-tax 
profits of their enterprises. And they too possess preferences with 
regard to public policies, their most preferred position being V- . 
The greater their after-tax incomes, and the more government policies 
(V) approximate their policy preferences, the happier they are. Given 
the monarch's choice of a tax rate and government policy position, and 
given market prices for inputs and products, the citizens then choose 
the level of capital (Kl and labor (L) which maximize their utility 
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(u2). 
We assume that at the outset the monarch's and citizens• 
choices rest in political-economic equilibrium. The problem then is: 
given an exogenous shock -- such as a war -- which leads to a need for 
greater taxes. and given the monarch's desire to remain in political-
2 -2 economic equilibrium (i. e. that that u remain} u ), how are taxes 
likely to be raised? 
The problem we are analyzing, then. is the behavior of a game. 
There are two maximizing agents, a monarch and a citizenry. At one 
level. their goals conflict; they conflict over policy and the 
apportionment of the national product between the private sector and 
the fisc. But at another level. the two depend upon each other. The 
government determines policies. which the citizens care about; and the 
citizens determine the magnitude of the product which constitutes the 
monarch's tax base. 
The model can be outlined as follows: 
The monarch : 
1 
max u 
( !;, V) 
u1((t)f(K,L), -(V - V+l2l 
2 -2 such that u 2 u . 
The producer: 
2 
max u 
(K,L) 
2 - 2 u ((1 - t)f(K, L) - rK - wL, -(V - V ) ) 
Where: 
v s cv-.v+1 
ul 
u2 
-2 u 
the utility of the monarch 
the utility of the citizens 
the utility of the citizens at the moment of 
political economic equilibrium 
V = the policy of the government 
V+ = the monarch's preferred policy poisition 
-
v = the citizens' preferred policy position 
K = capital 
L = labor 
r = the price of capital 
w = the price of labor 
f(K , L) = the output generated from capital and labor. 
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The other variables are labeled in the text. Critical limiting 
assumptions are clearly set out in the appendix. 
Let � stand for the elasticity of supply of a given component 
of the tax base -- an industry, for example. It can be assumed that 
the more mobile the factors of production employed in an industry, the 
greater the elasticity of the production of output from that industry. 
We can th�n snow that in choosing an optimum tax rate -- i. e. one that 
maximi�es his utility 
the following property: 
at < o 
a� 
the monarch will choose a t which possesses 
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[see appendix] 
That is, the monarch will impose higher � on those sectors of the 
economy which are less !!lastic, !_.�. which possess the less mobile 
factor�. 
and 
But within the set of optimal taxes we also find that: 
i!(V-V-) 
at < o 
a2(V-V-) < 0 ata11 
[see appendix] 
That is, in efforts to maximize his utility, the monarch, 
behaving rationally, will trade off concessions in policies for 
increases in the tax rate. Moreover, the monarch will do this to a 
greater degree the higher the elasticity of the tax base. The 
implication of both findings is clear: Those sectors which possess 
more mobile factors will have greater control over public policy. 23 
SOME WISE MEN 
It is interesting to turn to the writings of others who have 
thought about the linkages between taxation and representation. Among 
them would be Montesquieu; the Physiocratic writers, Quesney and 
Mirabeau; and Albert Hirschman, whose work has done so much to revive 
the interest of contemporary political economists in these earlier 
w1·iters and whose noted essay, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty arrives at 
conclusions strikingly at variance with our own. 
Montesquieu 
As Hirschman's review of Montesquieu in his� Passions and 
the Interests suggests, Montesquieu was convinced that the rise of 
commerce generated desirable political consequences. As Montesquieu 
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wrote, "it is almost a gen�ral rule that whereever the ways of men are 
gentle 
• there is commerce; and wherever there is commerce, the 
24 ways of men are gentle. " Commerce promotes peace, Montesquieu held; 
and it also promotes the reduction of the arbitrary use of state 
power. In particular, the increased mobility of assets, Montesquieu 
argued, engendered restraint on the part of monarchs. Writing of the 
invention of the letter of credit, Montesquieu stated: 
through this means commerce could elude violence • . .  ; for the 
richest trader had only invisible wealth which could be sent 
everywhere without leaving any trace • . •  Since that time, the 
rulers have been compelled to govern with greater wisdom than they 
themselves have intended • . .  25 
Quesnay and Mirabeau 
In their Philosophie Rurale, the great Physiocrats, Quesnay 
and Mirabeau, also commented on the political consequences of the rise 
of commerce. Their conclusion bears a strong similarity to our own: 
All the possessions [of commercial societies] consist . . .  
of scattered and secret securities, a few warehouses, and 
passive and active debts, whose true owners are to some 
extent unknown, since no one knows which of them are paid 
and which of them are owing. No wealth which is immaterial 
is kept in peoples' pockets can ever be got hold of by the 
sovereign power, and consequently will yield it nothing at 
all. . The wealthy merchant, trader, banker, etc. , will 
always be a member of a republic. In whatever place he may 
live, he will always enjoy the immunity which is inherent 
in the scattered and unknown character of his property. 
It would be useless for the authorities to try to force him 
to fulfill the duties of a subject: they are obliged, in 
order to induce him to fit in with their plans, to treat him 
a master. and to make it worth his while to contribute 
voluntarily to the public revenue. 26 
Albert Hirschman 
It is from Hirschman's own studies that the above quotations 
are drawn. But what of hi:; own theorizing? 
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In the model which he presents in Exit, Voice and Loyalty, 
Hirschman argues that an as set owner under adverse economic conditions 
possesses two alternatives: to exit from the market or to "give 
voice," i. e. to remain in the market but to alter conditions within it 
through political action. 27 One reason for remaining in the market is 
loyalty; loyal consumers of 'widgets, • for example, will purchase them 
even in periods of declining quality while lobbying the management to 
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rectify defects. Another is the cost of mobility. Given high 
opportunity costs of switching, the asset may be inelastically 
consumed, even in periods of declining quality, or inelastically 
supplied, even while facing declining prices. Workers, for example, 
may be too old to leave a declining industry or skills and capital may 
be too specialized to switch costlessly to other sectors. 
By Hirschman's reasoning, then, we should predict that the 
owners of immobile factors will take the political initiative; they 
will give voice and express their preferences in arenas other than the 
market. Our model predicts the opposite. 
There are two basic reasons for the contrasting results. One 
is that we allow tradeoffs along two dimensions: policies and income. 
Increased exactions in one may be compensated for by increased 
indulgences in another. Secondly, Hirschman looks only at one side of 
the bargain; as a result, he fails to analyze the potential for 
strategy. In the context of the tax problem, for example, he analyzes 
the behavior of only the supplier of taxes; the behavior of the 
"demauder, "  i. e. the monarch, is ignored. But obviously both sides 
belong in the model; and knowing that the holders of taxable assets 
can exit, the demanders of taxes would surely take into account the 
potential for that behavior in calculating their best revenue 
strategy. Both reasons come into play in generating the divergence 
between Hirschman's conclusions and our own. For the capacity for 
strategic calculations by maximizing monarchs results in the owners of 
rnoti_ile factors which the monarch seeks to tax being compensated along 
the second dimension, i. e. being given greater voice over the policy 
choices of governments. 
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Surely in politics, even if not in markets, a model which 
incorporates strategic behavior is to be preferred. For this reason, 
we prefer our reasoning to Hirschman's. 
EXTENSIONS 
Thus far we have explored the formal properties of our 
argum�nt, related it to the arguments of others, and defended it 
again3t a well-known alternative. The seminal materials for the 
argument were historical: States seeking taxes developed forms of 
political representation as markets grew, and groups which possessed 
the most mobile factors -- traders and capitalists -- gained control 
over policy. What of the ability of the model to illuminate behavior 
which emerges in seemingly unrelated fields? 
Urban Politics 
In the contemporary period, the study of urban politics was 
spawned by the famous debates between Hunter and Dahl. 28 Hunter 
measured reputations for power and concluded that business dominated 
urban decision making. Dahl measured power in terms of who actually 
took part in policy decisions and he concluded that bureaucrats, civic 
groups and politicians were at least as powerful as businessmen. 
Indeed, he argued, businessmen appeared largely to have withdrawn from 
urban politics, save with respect to issues which were of immediate 
economic consequence. Those who believed in "Marxist" interpretations 
of American politics rallied behind Hunter; the pluralists endorsed 
Dahl. 
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A third position remained: Was it not possible that the 
interests of a group, such as business, could be powerful, even though 
businessmen themselves did not take part in actual decision making? 
This possibility represented the persuasive core of the notion of 
"non-decisions" propounded by Baratz and B achrach. 29 It was 
investigated by Crenson in his study of industrial regulation by 
municipalities. 30 
Crenson found very little relationship between the 
participation of industry in the public domain and the policy choices 
of municipalities; rather, it was the threat of industrial defection 
relocation by industries to other, more favorable jurisdictions 
which influenced policy choices. Crenson's fundamental insight -­
that markets do not correspond to jurisdictions and that the threat of 
market defection places limits on municipal policy making was later 
elaborated by Paul Peterson into a border theory of urban politics and 
published in a book entitled, aptly enough, City Limits. 31 
Developing Areas 
Mentioned at the outset were the works of Lipset, Coleman and 
others who explored the relationship between development and 
democracy. Among the major critics of these works stand the 
contemporary political economists, many of whom are Marxists. Their 
principal criticism is that development leads to the capture of public 
policy by international capital and the subordination of other 
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interests to the interests of this fraction. 
Some see international capital as being coercive; through 
repression. they argue, it secures favorable economic conditions in 
third world nations. 32 Others, while not endorsing the thesis of 
coercion. nonetheless stress the capacity of international capital to 
dictate policy choices to third world governments. 33 Arrayed against 
these analysts are others who posit the relative "autonomy of the 
political" and stress the ability of political leaders and 
bureaucratic elites in third world countries to pursue public 
interests independent of the economic interests of international 
capital. 34 
The reasoning advanced in this article would suggest the value 
of a synthesis between last two positions. As the specification of 
our model suggests, we too posit the autonomy of the political and 
resist reducing the government to an agent of economic interests. The 
government's interests stand autonomous of, and partially 
contradictory to, those of the private sector. But we also treat the 
political sector as dependent and its policies as conditioned by the 
need to anticipate the market response of economic agents. In the 
context uf the world economy, the most effective market response would 
be to move as�ets to other. more favorable jurisdictions. And an 
implication of our analysis is that it is therefore possible for 
international capital, as opposed to national capital, farming, or 
labor. to gain control of public policy in third world nations. 
Our approach therefore most closely parallels that of Cardoso, 
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who, while rejecting the notion that international capital is 
unproductive {i. e. that it produces underdevelopment) or inherently 
repressive, nonetheless underscores its role in placing limits upon 
the policy choices of third world governments. 35 While not seizing 
power nor being conferred political representation in the upper 
reaches of government, international capital may nonetheless be able 
to exercise disproportionate influence over government policy. Being 
mobile, it can defect. 
Our analysis therefore finds a range of applications far 
distant in place and time from medieval Europe. It would appear, 
then, to be quite general. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have proposed a model which represents the 
relationship between economic actors and revenue seeking governments. 
Given a need for revenues, the model predicts the allocation of the 
new tax burden and patterns of control over public policy. 
The model was motivated by the history of the rise of 
parliaments in Western Europe. It was designed to employ "neo­
classical" economic techniques to explore themes which have been 
developed most clearly in Marxist writings. It has been extended to 
the realm of urban and developmental politics. Within these 
literatures, it has focused most centrally on the problem of 
democracy. 
Most importantly. the model suggests the way in which. given a 
need for revenues, specific fractions of the private sector can gain 
control over public policy. And it characterizes precisely the 
factors which yield differences in the ability of economic agents to 
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employ the market to defect from the tax- levying state. The analysis 
thus gives insight into both the origins and the limitations of 
political democracy. 
21 
APPENDIX 
As described in the text, the problem may be written in the following 
form: 
(i) Producers, given t and V, choose K and L to maximize 
u2((1 - t)f(K, Ll - rK - wL, - (V - V-)2). 
The solution of this maximization problem can be characterized as 
• • K (t, V). L (t, V). 
• • (ii) Government, knowing K (t, V) and L (t, V), then chooses t and V to 
maximize 
u1(tf(K•, L•), - (V - V+)2) 
such that 
2 • • • • - 2 -2 u (( 1 - t) f(K , L ) - rK - wL , - ( V - V ) ) L. u • 
Before deriving the results, some assumptions are imposed: 
(Al) 1 2 1 2 u1 > 0 , u1 > 0, u2 > 0, u2 > 0 . 
quasi-concave functions. 
Also, both u
1 
and u
2 
are 
(A2) f(K, L) is a quasi-concave function. 
(A3l max u2((1 - t)f(K, L) - rK - wL, - CV+ - V-)2) < \J2, \/ t e [0, 11. 
K, L 
Now, the first order conditions for the producers' problem are: 
(1 - t)fK r, (1 - tlfL = w. 
Therefore, the government's problem can be rewritten as: 
1 + 2 max u (tf(K,L), - (V - V )  ) + Al[(l - t)fK - r] t,V,K,L 
2 -2 + A2[(1 - t)fL - wl + µ (u - u ). 
The first-order conditions, then are: 
1 2 u1f(K,L) - AlfK - A2fL + µ[-f(KL)u11 = 0 
+ 1 2 --2(V - V >u2 + µu2C-2(V - V )) = 0 
1 2 tu1fK + Al(l - t)fKK + A2(1 - t)fKL + µu1[(1 - t)fK - r] = 0 
1 2 tulfL + Al(l - t)fKL + A2(1 - t)fL L  + µul[(l - t)fL - w] = 0 
(1 - t)fK = r 
(1 - t)fL = w 
2 -2 2 -2 µ (u - u > = o, µ 2 o, u 2 u 
Substitute equations (5) and (6 ) into equations (3) and (4), 
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(1) 
( 2) 
(3) 
(4) 
( 5) 
(6) 
(7) 
respectively. Then, by Cramer's rule, we can solve for Al and A2 as 
follows: 
P·1J lA2l 
-u1t 
--- - ___ 
1 
____ 2 __ 
(1 - t)(fKKfLL - fKL) 
[ f Kf LL - f L f KL l 
-fKfKL + fLfKd 
Substituting (8) into (1), after algebraic manipulations, we have 
u� • [ 1 -1n ] 1 - t 2 µul 
where 11 is the supply el asticity such that 
2 2 
-fKfLL + 2fKf LfKL - fLfKK 'l � --- - - --- - ---- - ----- - -- --2 
f(fKKfLL - fKL) 
( 8) 
( 9) 
( 10) 
Lemma 1. t < _1_ 1 + 11 
Proof: 1 By Al and A3, we knowµ F 0, u1, 
implies 1 - 1 �n t > O � t11 < 1 - t � t 
u� > 0. Hence equation (9) 
< _1_ 1 + 11 
Lemma _l. a(V a� Y�l < o along the optimal solutions path. 
L3 
2 -2 Proof: Since µ F 0, hence along the optimal solutions path, u = u . 
By taking the total derivative, we thus have 
2 - 2 --u1f(K,L)dt - 2(V - V )u2d CV - V ) = 0 
2 
�111 _ 11- , -u1f(K,L) � .LL = ---- < o. at 2(V - v->u2 2 
To proceed further. two additional assumptions are imposed: 
(A4) u1(",") 
(A5 ) u2(",") 
tKaL� - log(V - V+l2 where a + � < 1 
(1 - t) [KaL� - rK - wL] - log(V - V-)2. 
Lemma 3. at < o. a11 
Proof: Under (A4) and (A5) ,  equation (9) is reduced to 
1 - -1n 1 - t µ. 
On the other hand, equation (2) implies 
+ 1 [ - ] 1 -2(V - V ) - ---- + µ -2(V - V ) --
(V - V+>2 (V - V-)2 
0 
� v - v- = _IL_ < v+ - v- > = _!_::_i-=--11L < v+ - v->. 1 + µ 2 - 2t - t11 
(11) 
by (11). 
Hence, liL=_Ll at -n 2 (V+ - V-) .  (2 - 2t - tri) 
Also. Lemma 2 claims 
2L, 
(12) 
( 13) 
a(V - V-) 
at }f<K. L) (V - V-) 
1 1 - t - tn + -- zf(K, L) 2 - 2t - tri CV - V ) .  
Comparing equation (13) to equation (14) , we have 
n 1 z<l - t - tri) f(K, L) . 2 - 2 t - tri 
By taking the total derivative, we have 
r__n_C.L:t_n1_2 + }o + ri) f(K, L) 1 dt l<2 - 2 t - t11) � 
(- _2tf(K • L) - !n af(K.1.l - __ 2_.::_1.L_ __ Jd 2 a11 2 Tl· (2 - 2t - tri> 
at Hence. ari < O. 
Lemma 4. 
�2 "' -
At any fixed t lL...l.!_.::__y_j_ 
• atari < o. 
!',roof: By taking the partial derivative with respect to equation 
(13), 
D!L::_1�1 
atari 
_2_...=_ll.._.±._J;n__ (V+ - V-) < 0. 3 -(2 - 2t - tri) 
(14) 
( 15) 
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